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Two seemingly different federal enforcement systems that affect the 
movement of unskilled workers—the 1793 and 1850 Fugitive Slave Acts and 
current state immigration enforcement policies—have remarkable similarities.  
Both systems are political stories that are demonstrative of the failure of 
federalism.  The federal government’s current failure to enforce immigration 
laws has encouraged state and local governments to pass their own laws.  
Alabama and Arizona have enacted far-reaching laws, which are similar to the 
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federal Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g) programs.1  Both have been 
challenged on constitutional preemption and equal protection grounds.2  
Recent scholarship has focused mainly on whether the state and local actions 
are constitutionally preempted.3  Current scholarship has overlooked ways the 
federal government has previously utilized state and local entities to enforce 
federal laws that govern individual rights.4  For example, the landmark case 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania held that the federal government could not confer power 
to the states to implement the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.5  Prigg declared that 
the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act and the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause 
provided the exclusive remedy for the return of runaway slaves.6  This case 
provides a normative and prescriptive response to contemporary debates about 
immigration federalism at a time when state and local governments are 
enacting their own immigration legislation due to federal inaction. 
This Article uses legal history to understand the enforcement of immigration 
law and policy.  This discussion began with immigration scholar Gerald 
Neuman’s 1993 article, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 
(1776-1875).7  Neuman claimed, “ignoring the early history of immigration 
                                                     
 1. Compare S.B. 1070, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. (2011)), and HB56, 2011 Ala. Acts 535, with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). 
 2. United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, and dismissed in part, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Arizona, 703 F. 
Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and 
remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 3. See, e.g., Anil Kalhan, Immigration Enforcement and Federalism After September 11, 
2001, in IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND SECURITY: EUROPE AND AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 181–82 (Ariane Chebel d’Appolonia & Simon Reich eds., 2008), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/anil_kalhan/3; Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local 
Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 27, 53 (2007); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty 
and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1376–77, 1391–95 (2006); 
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 567, 620–28 (2008); Tiffany Walters Kleinert, Comment, Local and State Enforcement of 
Immigration Law: An Equal Protection Analysis, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1103, 1106–10 (2006). 
 4. But see Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial Tolerance, and the Value 
of “Justice Delayed”, 78 IOWA L. REV. 89, 99 (1992) (discussing the difficulties in drawing too 
close a historical parallel between immigration and the Fugitive Slave Acts, but noting that 
“[r]eturning to slavery meant breaking up families, depriving mortgage holders of full payment, 
and destroying the continuity and harmony of a community.”); see also Craig B. Mousin, A Clear 
View from the Prairie: Harold Washington and the People of Illinois Respond to Federal 
Encroachment of Human Rights, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 285, 287–88 (2005) (examining how “Chicago 
precedent of prohibiting local police from cooperating with federal officials in enforcing the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 . . . provide[s] insight into city government’s role, if any, when 
Congress requires local law enforcement to control movement of people.”). 
 5. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625–26 (1842). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, (1776-1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1993) (examining the states’ early role in regulating immigration). 
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regulation impairs constitutional understandings of the scope and character of 
federal immigration power, and of the way in which this power is distributed 
between Congress and the President.”8  Recently, Professor Kerry Abrams 
argued that the 1875 Page Act was the country’s first restrictive federal 
immigration law.9  Abrams also reviewed early state restrictions and noted that 
California “compared the immigration of ‘persons incompetent to become 
citizens’ with immigration of free blacks.  If the state police power gave 
Southern states the authority to restrict the migration of free blacks, the logic 
went, why could not California restrict the migration of the Chinese?”10 
This article furthers the Neuman and Abrams analyses, arguing that we 
should look back further to the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act to understand how the 
Act brought about the passing of the Equal Protection Clause and how current 
immigration enforcement policies can abrogate individual rights.  Using these 
articles as a starting point, this Article explores the similarities between the 
current immigration enforcement policies and the Fugitive Slave Acts. 
To date, legal scholars have not engaged in this comparison.11  Legal 
historians who have examined the Fugitive Slave Acts have done so in the 
context of their constitutional foundations.12  These historians, however, have 
not explored how the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Acts relates to 
contemporary federal enforcement of immigration laws, perhaps because, as 
Professor Daniel Kanstroom wrote, “the repugnant but consistent classification 
of fugitive slave cases as matters of property renders comparison with the 
                                                                                                                          
Neuman also encouraged others to explore regulation of immigration preceding 1875.  Id. at 
1840. 
 8. Id. at 1834–35. 
 9. Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 6 
VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2009) [hereinafter Abrams, Hidden Dimension] (arguing that 
conceptualizations of pre-1875 immigration law should be expanded to include intra-state and 
state-to-territory migration); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of 
Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 645–647 (2005) [hereinafter Abrams, Polygamy] 
(arguing for the inclusion of the 1875 Page Law in understanding immigration federalism). 
 10. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 673 (footnote omitted). 
 11. But see Mousin, supra note 4, at 292. 
 12. See Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and Supreme Court 
Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519, 543 (2009) [hereinafter Finkelman, John McLean]; see also 
Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 621 (1993) 
[hereinafter Finkelman, Prigg]; Paul Finkelman, The Kidnapping of John Davis and the Adoption 
of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, 56 J. S. HIST. 397, 397 (1990); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The 
Supreme Court and Congress’s Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral 
Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 157 (2004) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, Moral Anomaly] 
(“[S]cholarly studies of the Fugitive Slave Clause and the Fugitive Slave Acts have focused on 
the ways this area of federal law was antithetical to the constitutional liberties of the tragic 
individuals it assisted slave owners to return to slavery.”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic 
Irony of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in 
Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015, 1023–25 (1997) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony] 
(collecting important full-length legal histories on fugitive slave laws at 1027 n.57); Anthony J. 
Sebok, Judging the Fugitive Slave Acts, 100 YALE L.J. 1835, 1835–36 (1991). 
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deportation system difficult.”13  Outside the field of law, scholar and journalist 
Robert Lovato has alleged that the Fugitive Slave Acts mirror federal 
immigration enforcement programs such as Secure Our Communities 
Programs and Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety 
and Security (ACCESS).14  Lovato argues, “[f]ederal laws that allowed local 
and state authorities to pursue blacks under the Fugitive Slave Act appear to be 
the model for the Bush Administration’s [ACCESS] program, which allows 
states to deputize law enforcement officials to chase, detain, arrest and jail the 
undocumented.”15 
This Article challenges the notion of the Fugitive Slave Acts’ irrelevance by 
examining in detail the similarities of both systems and the results that are 
produced when the federal government is provided with unfettered discretion 
to abrogate individual rights.16  This Article also contributes to a growing body 
of scholarship analyzing the role of African American slavery and pre-1875 
immigration history in our conceptualization of the U.S. immigration system.  
Several scholars have already called for the inclusion of the early forced 
migration patterns of African Americans as part of our conceptualization of 
immigration history.17   
                                                     
 13. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 81 
(2010); see also Neuman, supra note 7, at 1837 n.18 (providing reasons against reframing 
immigration law to place slavery at its origin because slavery was involuntary, enslaved people 
were deemed less than fully human, and the concerns that viewing slavery as immigration may be 
“euphemistic”). 
 14. Roberto Lovato, Juan Crow in Georgia, THE NATION, May 26, 2008, at 20, 21, 
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/juan-crow-georgia. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Rhonda V. MaGee, Slavery as Immigration?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 273, 287 (2009) 
(citing Walter Berns, The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves, 78 YALE L.J. 198, 200 
(1968)). 
As Bilder has shown, slavery was not merely a degrading, exploitative economic 
system, legal status assignment, and existential condition.  Rather it was also a means 
of transporting men and women from Africa and the diaspora into the colonies and 
slave-importing southern states.  In other words, slavery was “both a labor relationship 
and a way of moving people” from one national landscape to another. Enslaved people 
were “simultaneously individuals who increased population and a pool of bound labor.” 
Id. (quoting Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and 
Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 761 (1996) (footnotes omitted)). 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 274 (analyzing the forced migration of African Americans through the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade).  Legal scholars and historians have advocated for the inclusion of the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade in the United States’ current immigration and human trafficking 
policies.  See Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans 
and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 207, 211–12 (2007); see also Karen 
Bravo, Free Labor! A Labor Liberalization Solution to Modern Trafficking in Humans, 18 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 545, 569–70 (2009) [hereinafter Bravo, Free Labor].  In 
addition, some scholars use the forced migration of slaves to challenge the notion that early 
American history contained no immigration policy.  MaGee, supra note 16, at 297 (citing Gabriel 
J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping & Fong Yue Ting, The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION 
STORIES 7 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005)); id. at 276 (“[C]hattel slavery was, 
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This examination addresses three main thematic questions: (1) how can 
social norms embedded in laws create a system that perpetuates tiered 
personhood?; (2) how has the federal government’s action or inaction spurred 
state and local action that violates individual rights?; and (3) does acceptance 
of anti-immigrant laws reinforce divisive cultural norms that prevent 
integration of immigrants of color?18   
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides an overview of the 
implementation and enforcement of the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause 
and the 1793 and 1850 Fugitive Slave Acts.  This Part also explores the 
implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and 
the evisceration of the Fugitive Slave Acts when subsequent immigration laws 
refused to recognize equal protection rights for immigrants.  Part II explores 
the reverse immigration-federalism story in which states and localities are 
enacting immigration legislation against the backdrop of federal inaction.  Part 
III explores how both the Fugitive Slave Acts and current immigration 
enforcement laws create outsiders by failing to protect individual liberty rights.  
The Article concludes with broad doctrinal lessons on immigration federalism 
and demonstrates how the law and legal actors can perpetuate norms that 
facilitate the creation of tiered personhood. 
I.  COMPARING THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACTS AND PRIGG V. PENNSYLVANIA’S 
CONTRIBUTION TO IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 
A.  1789 Fugitive Slave Clause and the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act 
During the Constitution’s drafting, the Fugitive Slave Clause was added as a 
compromise between the northern and southern states.19  The clause provided: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws 
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or 
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but 
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or 
Labour may be due.20 
                                                                                                                          
among very many other things, a compulsory form of immigration, the protection and regulation 
of which, under federal and state law, was our nation’s first system of ‘immigration law.’  As a 
consequence, the formal system that developed was inculcated with the notion of a permanent,  
quasi-citizen-worker underclass and privileged white ethnics under naturalization law—its 
legacies we can see up to the present day.”).  MaGee criticizes the omission of African 
Americans’ migration to the United States and alleges that the trans-Atlantic slave trade was 
“among the most significant historical antecedents of contemporary immigration law and policy, 
with legacies that reverberate through immigration law and policy in the United States up to the 
present day.” Id. at 274–75. 
 18. Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant 
Laws, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 170–71 (2010). 
 19. THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 
1780–1861, at 16–17 (1974). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII). 
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According to Robert J. Kaczorowski, the Clause codified the common law 
right of reception, which “authorized the owner of chattel, such as livestock [or 
slaves] . . . , that strayed or were taken away, to recover them through  
self-help, provided it could be done without a breach of the peace.”21  Thus, the 
Fugitive Slave Clause permitted the federal government to resolve conflicts 
amongst the states by enforcing the right of slave owners to retrieve their 
fleeing property.22  The Supreme Court eventually affirmed this grant of 
power, noting that “if, indeed, the Constitution guarantees the right . . . the 
natural inference certainly is, that the national government is clothed with the 
appropriate authority and functions to enforce it.”23 
In order to make the Fugitive Slave Clause operational, Congress passed the 
Fugitive Slave Act in 1793 (1793 Act).24  The 1793 Act provided a process to 
return fugitive slaves, as well as penalties for those who obstructed their 
rendition.25  Slave owners and their agents had a cause of action to enforce 
their constitutionally secured right of reception in private lawsuits brought in 
federal and state courts under the 1793 Act.26  Their efforts were often 
successful as “[s]lave-owners and their agents brought many civil suits under 
the 1793 statute, and they succeeded in recovering the civil fine and tort 
damages more often than they failed.”27 
The removal process under the 1793 Act involved several steps: (1) the 
fugitive slave was seized or arrested; (2) the slave owner took the slave before 
a judge or magistrate in any state or federal court;28 (3) upon proof the official 
issued a certificate authorizing removal of the fugitive slave from the state; and 
(4) a penalty of a fine or jail time was imposed if a person had or attempted to 
obstruct or hinder rights under the Act.29  The seized fugitive slave “was not 
entitled to a trial by jury, was not guaranteed the right to testify, and oral 
testimony was [only] permitted to prove the claim of ownership.”30  There was 
no statute of limitation on claims under the Fugitive Slave Act, making the fear 
of recapture indefinite.31 
                                                     
 21. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1024. 
 22. Id. at 1025. 
 23. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842); see also Kaczorowski, The 
Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1025 (explaining the significance of the Fugitive Slave Clause). 
 24. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–05 (1845); see also Kaczorowski, The 
Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1025 (“Congress exercised plenary power under the Fugitive 
Slave Clause when it enacted a statute to enforce it.”). 
 25. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1026. 
 26. Id. at 1027; see also Act of Feb. 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. at 302–05. 
 27. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1027; see also id. at 1027 n.58 
(collecting cases). 
 28. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 21. 
 29. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. at 302–05. 
 30. Morgan Cloud, Quakers, Slaves and the Founders: Profiling to Save the Union, 73 
MISS. L.J. 369, 401 (2003) (citing Act of Feb. 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. at 305). 
 31. Id. at 401–02. 
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The 1793 Act proved ineffective for three reasons: (1) the reluctance of local 
officers to enforce the provisions; (2) the underlying moral conflict between 
the northern and southern states regarding slavery; and (3) the constitutionality 
of the Act.32  In addition, “[a]s federal judges were rather scarce at the time, the 
implementation of this law was often quite inefficient, inconvenient, and 
dangerous.  The law did not authorize the issuance of warrants, nor did it allow 
federal marshals to aid in the pursuit and capture of fugitives.”33 
Many cases brought under the 1793 Act were actions in tort against persons 
who harbored or concealed fugitive slaves.34  Anyone who helped fugitive 
slaves abscond would be subject to a $500 fine.35  Despite their personal views 
to the contrary and the lack of uniformity in state law on the issue, “antebellum 
state and federal judges felt obligated to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause and 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.”36  For example, in Jones v. Van Zandt, the 
plaintiff, a citizen from Kentucky, brought an action against the defendant, a 
citizen from Ohio, for harboring and concealing fugitive slaves.37  Jones 
alleged that Van Zandt knew the persons were fugitive slaves yet concealed 
them.38  Van Zandt claimed that he lacked notice that the persons he helped 
were fugitive slaves39 and argued that, in order to be fined, proper notice was 
required.40  The Supreme Court found that verbal notice or acts evidencing 
knowledge of the fugitive slave’s status was enough to establish requisite 
notice.41  Further, the Court found that an overt act intended to “elude the 
vigilance of the master or his agent, and which is calculated to attain such an 
object is a harboring.”42 
B. State Personal Liberty Laws 
Between 1780 and 1861, northern states passed personal liberty laws, some 
in response to the 1793 Act.43  Personal liberty laws were intended to interfere 
with slave owners’ efforts to recapture slaves as well as protect free blacks and 
                                                     
 32. Charles A. Lindquist, The Origin and Development of the United States Commissioner 
System, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 7 (1970) (quoting HOMER S. CUMMINGS & CARL 
MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL 
EXECUTIVE 175 (1937)); see also Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1027–30. 
 33. KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 78. 
 34. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1026–27. 
 35. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. at 302–05.  
 36. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1027–28; see also id. at 1028 n.60 
(collecting several cases displaying this dichotomy). 
 37. Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 217 (1847). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 225. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 231–32. 
 42. Id. at 232. 
 43. MORRIS, supra note 19, at x–xi. 
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fugitive slaves from fugitive slave laws.44  The northern states wanted alleged 
fugitive slaves to have due process rights and a presumption of freedom.45 
Pennsylvania was at the forefront of enacting state laws to prevent the 
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.46  The Pennsylvania law stated that if 
any person attempted to remove a “negro or mulatto” from the state with the 
intention of enslaving him or her, that person would be guilty of a felony, fined 
up to $3,000, and sentenced to hard labor.47  Moreover, Pennsylvania 
considered children born to fugitive slaves while in the state to be free.48   
Vermont and New York passed personal liberty laws during the 1840s.49  
These laws gave those accused as fugitive slaves the right to trial by jury and 
the right to an attorney.50  Connecticut and Indiana also provided trial by jury 
on appeal.51  Connecticut’s early protective statutes, although employing 
language in the preamble favoring the return of fugitive slaves, fined state 
officials who took part in fugitive slave cases.52 
                                                     
 44. MARION GLEASON MCDOUGALL, FUGITIVE SLAVES (1619-1865), at 65 (1891). 
 45. Id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 19, at 12 (describing the revisions northern states made 
to their state laws). 
When the federal government refused to assert a right to eliminate gradually the 
property interest in human beings, most antislavery people in the free states saw little 
alternative but to try to separate sharply slavery and freedom at both the state and 
federal levels, and to assure that those who were free would not be deprived of their 
personal liberty. 
MORRIS, supra note 19, at 24. 
 46. Edward Raymond Turner, The Abolition of Slavery in Pennsylvania, 36 PA. MAG. HIST. 
& BIOGRAPHY 129, 129 (1912), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/20085586. 
 47. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 539 (1842). The personal liberty statute 
provided 
that if any person or persons shall from and after the passing of the act, by force or 
violence take and carry away, or cause to be taken and carried away, and shall by fraud 
or false pretense, seduce, or cause to be seduced, or shall attempt to take, carry away, or 
seduce any negro or mulatto from any part of that commonwealth, with a design and 
intention of selling and disposing of, or causing to be sold, or of keeping and detaining, 
or of causing to be kept and detained, such negro or mulatto, as a slave or servant for 
life, or for any term whatsoever; every such person or persons, his or their aiders or 
abettors, shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of felony, and shall forfeit and 
pay a sum not less than five hundred, nor more than one thousand dollars; and 
moreover, shall be sentenced to undergo a servitude for any term or terms of years, not 
less than seven years nor exceeding twenty-one years; and shall be confined and kept to 
hard labour . . . . 
Id. at 608. 
 48. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 65 
(1981). 
 49. MCDOUGALL, supra note 44, at 66. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 65. 
 52. Id. at 65–66. 
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In the South, South Carolina passed its Declaration of the Causes of 
Secession in 1860.53  In this declaration, the state noted that “fourteen of the 
States have deliberately refused for years past to fulfill their constitutional 
obligations, and we refer to their own statutes for the proof.”54  In response, 
Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio posited, “[c]annot a sovereign State of this 
Union prevent the kidnapping of her free citizens because you have a right to 
claim a slave fleeing from service?”55  Previously, the northern states took 
“positive action to remove the internal legal principles built upon the 
assumption that a person could be considered a thing.”56  This led to a schism 
on the Mason/Dixon Line57 and raised an issue of comity amongst states.58  
C.  Prigg v. Pennsylvania and the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania was the main case challenging federal and state action 
under the 1793 Act.59  In 1832, Edward Prigg, a professional slave catcher, 
seized Margaret Morgan, a black woman, whose former owner, John Ashmore, 
let her live virtually free in Maryland despite never formally emancipating 
her.60  Because Morgan’s parents were informally emancipated, “Morgan grew 
up thinking she was free and had always lived as a free woman in Maryland.”61  
Thereafter, she moved to Pennsylvania, married a freeborn black man, and had 
children.62  At least one of the children was born in Pennsylvania.63 
Ashmore’s heirs wanted Morgan returned as a slave and sent Prigg to 
capture her in Pennsylvania.64  The state refused to return Morgan because 
Prigg failed to comply with its personal liberty statute.65  Prigg applied to a 
state magistrate for certificates of removal, invoking the federal Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1793.66  These certificates would allow Prigg to remove Morgan to 
Maryland legally.67  When Prigg could not obtain the certificates, he took 
                                                     
 53. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 1. 
 54. DECLARATION OF THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH INDUCE AND JUSTIFY THE 
SECESSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA FROM THE FEDERAL UNION 7 (1860). 
 55. CONG. GLOBE APP., 36TH, 1ST SESS. 152 (1860). 
 56. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 7. 
 57. Id. at 8. 
 58. Id. at 13–14. 
 59. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 60. Id. at 608–09. 
 61. Finkelman, John Mclean, supra note 12, at 544–45. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 609. 
 64. Finkelman, Prigg, supra note 12, at 611. 
 65. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 608–09; THOMAS H. TALBOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
RESPECTING FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE OR LABOR, AND THE ACT OF CONGRESS, OF SEPTEMBER 
18, 1850, at 29 (1852). 
 66. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 609. 
 67. See Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–05 (1845). 
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Morgan and her children to Maryland in violation of Pennsylvania law.68  
What ensued was a long battle between Pennsylvania’s personal liberty laws 
and the Ashmore heirs’ ability to remove Morgan to Maryland as a slave under 
the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.69  Pennsylvania indicted Prigg, who pled not 
guilty,70 and the state requested his extradition from Maryland.71  Upon Prigg’s 
return, he was convicted for violating Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law.72  
Following his conviction, he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.73  
The Court considered two issues in Prigg.  First, the Court considered 
whether the power to legislate under the Fugitive Slave Clause of the 
Constitution resided with the federal government or the states.74  Second, the 
Court considered whether federal law could oblige state officials to execute 
federal fugitive-slave law.75  Pennsylvania argued its law was based on the 
police powers that the Tenth Amendment secured.76 
The Court held that the 1793 Act’s attempt to confer state magistrates 
jurisdiction over fugitive slaves was unconstitutional.77  Specifically, the 
Supreme Court Justices found that Congress had exclusive jurisdiction over 
fugitive slaves and that only federal courts could enforce rights under the 1793 
Act.78  Legal scholar Paul Finkelman succinctly described the Court’s holding 
as stating “that while state officials ought to enforce the federal Fugitive Slave 
Act, Congress could not obligate them to do so because Congress did not pay 
their salaries.”79 
Justice Story’s majority opinion ruled that the constitutional clause 
prohibited the states from freeing fugitive slaves.80  The majority found that, 
because the federal law was based on a specific constitutional provision, 
national in scope, the federal power over the provision was exclusive.81  
Further, the Court found it inconsistent to state that federal power was 
                                                     
 68. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 609; see also FINKELMAN, supra note 48, at 134 (“One of the blacks 
Edward Prigg took to Maryland had been conceived and born in Pennsylvania ‘more than a year 
after the said negro woman had fled and escaped from Maryland.’” (quoting Prigg, 41 U.S. at 
609)). 
 69. Finkelman, Prigg, supra note 12, at 611–12. 
 70. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 608. 
 71. Finkelman, Prigg, supra note 12, at 605. 
 72. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 609. 
 73. Id. 
 74. TALBOT, supra note 65, at 29. 
 75. JANE H. PEASE & WILLIAM H. PEASE, THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW AND ANTHONY 
BURNS: A PROBLEM IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1975). 
 76. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 586; PEASE & PEASE, supra note 35, at 5. 
 77. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 598. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Finkelman, John McLean, supra note 12, at 543. 
 80. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 622. 
 81. Id. 
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exclusive, but then order the states to carry out the federal law.82  Therefore, 
the federal government was “bound, through its own proper departments, 
legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may require, to carry into effect 
all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution.”83  Although the 
Court believed that state judges should execute the federal law, it recognized 
that the federal government had no power to require them to do so.84  The 
Court did recognize, however, that, in certain instances, the States could 
“regulate and remove fugitive slaves from their borders” under the police 
power.85 
The disjointed holdings in Prigg encouraged opposition, which resulted in 
continuing disparities in the application of the law in different states.86  For 
example, northern states continued to pass personal liberty laws in opposition 
to the Supreme Court’s decision.87  Prohibitive personal liberty laws were 
passed in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont.88  After Prigg, “Northern resistance led to Southern demands for a 
more effective federal statute.”89  Because the Prigg Court held that mandatory 
state administration of the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional, there were 
demands for the creation of a federal body to exercise authority over the return 
of fugitive slaves.90  Consequently, Congress passed the 1850 Fugitive Slave 
Act (1850 Act).91  The 1850 Act provided for the appointment of a federal 
body to administer the system, a procedure for the deportation of slaves (that 
included the issuance of search and arrest warrants), the issuance of certificates 
of removal, the imposition of fines for interference, and the deputization of 
citizens to help with the administration of the system.92   
Under the 1850 Act, Congress authorized federal judges to appoint 
commissioners with “‘the powers that any justice of the peace or other 
magistrate of any of the United States’ had to arrest, imprison, or bail offenders 
                                                     
 82. Id. at 615–16. 
 83. Id. at 616. 
 84. Id. at 615–16. 
 85. KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 79. 
 86. See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE 
SLAVE LAW, 1850–1860, at 14 (1970). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1035. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Act of September 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462; Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, 
supra note 12, at 1035. 
 92. Act of September 18, 1850, §§ 1, 5–7, 9 Stat. at 462–64.  Section 1 stated that the 
federal government may “exercise the power that any justice of the peace, or other magistrate of 
any of the United States, may exercise in respect to offenders for any crime or offense against the 
United States by arresting, imprisoning, or bailing” by the same virtue as judicial courts of the 
United States.  Id. § 1. 
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of any crime against the United States.”93  Judges appointed commissioners94 
in each federal circuit95 and granted them “concurrent jurisdiction with district 
and circuit court judges over fugitive slave claims.”96  With these grants of 
authority, commissioners could issue certificates of removal to claimants upon 
satisfactory proof that a person was a fugitive slave.97  It was believed that the 
commissioners, unlike state officials, would be unbiased in their application of 
the Fugitive Slave Acts.98  Many federal agents enforced the return of fugitive 
slaves.99  Slave owners went to the appropriate court in their home state to 
initiate the removal process.100  In state court, the slave owner would have to 
“establish that his slave had escaped and owed the owner service or labor.”101  
The slave owner also “had to provide a general description of the fugitive.”102  
During these proceedings, 
[i]f the judge of the local court was satisfied that the first two points 
were correct, . . . an official transcript was given to the claimant.  
The transcript, when presented to a fugitive slave commissioner . . . , 
was to be received as conclusive evidence that the slave described in 
                                                     
 93. Id. § 1.  These “[c]ommissioners . . . were . . . appointed by the superior court of each 
territory where ‘reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives from labor’ were to be maintained.”  
CAMPBELL, supra note 86, at 24 (quoting Act of 1850, § 3, 9 Stat. at 462). 
 94. Lindquist, supra note 32, at 4 (noting that U.S. Commissioners were “[c]reated 
primarily in response to the state’s unwillingness to enforce unpopular federal laws in the early 
nineteenth century, the commissioner performs judicial functions for the federal government that 
are somewhat analogous to those performed by local magistrates or justices of the peace for the 
states”).  When Congress enacted the 1789 Judiciary Act, there was not a clear delineation 
between federal and state jurisdiction.  Id.  Initially, many National Republicans believed that 
state courts could perform federal functions. Id. at 5.  In response, “Congress authorized the 
circuit courts on February 20, 1812 ‘to appoint such and so many discreet persons, in different 
parts of the district, as such court shall deem necessary, to take acknowledgements of bail and 
affidavits.’  These ‘discrete persons’ . . . were customarily referred to as ‘commissioners of the 
circuit court.’”  Id. at 5–6 (footnotes omitted) (citing 1 Stat. 680–81, 682 (1812)). 
 95. Cloud, supra note 30, at 413. 
 96. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, §§ 3–4, 9 Stat. 462, 462). 
 97. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, § 4, 9 Stat. at 462; Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, 
at 1035–36 (citing Allen Johnson, The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Acts, 31 YALE L.J. 
161, 181–82 (1921)); see also CAMPBELL, supra note 86, at 24 (“The jurisdiction of the 
commissioners was to be concurrent with that of the circuit and district judges, and they had 
authority to grant certificates for the return of fugitive slaves.”).  The statute stated specifically 
that “the commissioners . . . shall grant certificates to such claimants, upon satisfactory proof 
being made, with authority to take and remove such fugitives from service or labor . . . to the 
State or Territory from which such persons may have escaped or fled.”  Act of Sept. 18, 1850, § 
4, 9 Stat. at 462 (emphasis added). 
 98. Lindquist, supra note 32, at 7–8. 
 99. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 75, at 11. 
 100. See CAMPBELL, supra note 86, at 113 (outlining the procedure for reclaiming a fugitive 
slave). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 113–14. 
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the transcript had escaped and owed service or labor to the 
claimant.103 
Fugitive slaves were not entitled to any rights during these proceedings.104  
Frequently, slaves were denied the “right to a jury trial, the right of the accused 
to testify in his own behalf, and the right to habeas corpus.”105  For example, 
congruent with the 1850 Act, statutes in South Carolina and Georgia provided 
“that the burden of legal proof was on free blacks to show that they were not 
slaves.”106  Despite their efforts, the free states were unable to provide alleged 
slaves with any protection because of the free states’ non-existent legal rights 
within the pro-slave states.107 
The state or local court provided the transcript to the commissioners within 
the federal district court and the commissioner would issue a warrant for the 
fugitive slave’s arrest.108  The 1850 Act “empowered commissioners . . . , as 
well as [federal] courts themselves, to issue certificates” of removal.109  The 
commissioners could also appoint persons, such as state officials, to execute 
warrants for the capture of fugitive slaves.110 
Once the warrants were issued for capture, 
[t]he law charged federal marshals and their deputies to execute all 
warrants for the arrest of alleged fugitives issued by the 
commissioners and the courts and to be financially accountable 
should the fugitives escape.  In pursuance of their duties, the 
marshals were authorized to summon and call to their aid the 
bystanders . . . [b]ut, should the claimant so prefer, he might seize a 
fugitive on his own responsibility without a warrant.111     
Following the adoption and enforcement of the 1850 Act, “for the first time, 
[the U.S. had] a large scale, relatively efficient federal system for the forced 
removal of people from one place to another on the basis of rather scanty 
proof, with minimal or no judicial oversight, and with only the most flimsy 
                                                     
 103. Id. at 114. 
 104. See Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1036 (noting that fugitive slaves 
were prohibited from entering evidence). 
 105. Id. at 1038; see also PEASE & PEASE, supra note 75, at 12 (stating that there was no 
provision for habeas corpus under the Fugitive Slave Act); id. at 11–12 (“At no time during this 
process was the alleged fugitive allowed to testify in his own behalf.”); Kaczorowski, The Tragic 
Irony, supra note 12, at 1038 (“[C]ombined with the summary nature of the proceeding based 
exclusively on the claimant’s evidence relating to the alleged fugitive’s status, [this] effectively 
prevented the free states’ presumption of freedom and other personal liberty guarantees from 
interfering with the slaveholder’s right of reception.”).   
 106. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 2, 11. 
 107. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1038. 
 108. CAMPBELL, supra note 86, at 114. 
 109. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 35, at 11. 
 110. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, §§ 2, 5, 9 Stat. 462, 462–63. 
 111. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 35, at 11; see also Act of Sept. 18, 1850, § 5, 9 Stat. at 463. 
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constitutional protections.”112  The underlying flaw with the 1850 Act was that 
it created a federal enforcement mechanism that allowed the preferences of 
slave-holding states to override those of the free states.113  The delegation itself 
was not problematic; rather, more troublesome was the federal preference to 
enforce a system that did not recognize what we now know as equal protection 
or individual liberty interests of the slaves. 
D.  The Impact of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Reconstruction Clause on the 
Fugitive Slave Acts and Early Immigration Law 
After passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, the states no longer had 
supreme authority over the forced migration of African American slaves.114  
Instead, they were required to treat all persons equally under the law.115  
Following the Dred Scott decision and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Reconstruction radically changed the federal-state balance.116 
At the time that Congress and the States passed the 1850 Act and personal 
liberty laws, there were numerous questions surrounding the boundaries of 
state sovereignty in relation to the federal government.117  States saw it within 
their authority to invoke their police power to control migration at a state 
level.118  For the first one hundred years of the country’s existence, states 
heavily regulated immigration.119  Many states had their own naturalization 
and immigration laws120 and laws were passed to protect states from 
                                                     
 112. KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 82 (“Three presidential successive  
administrations—those of Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan—enforced the laws vigorously.”). 
 113. Id. at 80–81. 
 114. Donald G. Nieman, From Slaves to Citizens: African-Americans, Rights Consciousness, 
and Reconstruction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2115, 2115–16 (1996) (“Even most antislavery 
politicians admitted that the Constitution denied the federal government authority to interfere 
with slavery in any state that chose to sanction it.”). 
 115. Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
1, 8 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (“States’ rights advocates knew that granting freedom meant 
much more than a simple exemption from personal servitude. They argued that freedom for 
African Americans would mean the right to participate in government and to enjoy the rights of 
citizenship. They fully appreciated that abolishing slavery would make African Americans their 
equals before the law.”). 
 116. Nieman, supra note 114, at 2116–17. 
 117. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and 
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 81–83 
(2002). 
 118. GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 19 (1996); Chin, supra note 17, 
at 7. 
 119. Chin, supra note 17, at 7 (“States regulated entry of immigrants, particularly in major 
seaports like New York and later San Francisco, but once the newcomer had successfully landed, 
he or she was in.  There were no green cards, no quotas, no caps, no Border Patrol or ICE 
[Immigration and Customs Enforcement].  And there was no deportation.”). 
 120. In the 1790 Naturalization Act, Congress required state courts to record applications for 
citizenship.  Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103.  Further, states had to transmit 
abstracts of citizenship applications and other naturalization records to the Secretary of State.  Act 
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undesirable classes of immigrants.121  These laws applied to immigrants as 
well as to citizens of other states.122 
The 1857 Dred Scott decision denied the possibility of citizenship to all 
slaves, ex-slaves, and descendants of slaves and also prevented Congress from 
prohibiting slavery in the territories.123  This case “‘made freedom local’ and 
‘it made slavery national, in the sense that slavery would be legal in any part of 
the United States where a state government had not abolished it.’”124  In 1868, 
Congress passed the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which 
effectively overturned Dred Scott, thus providing citizenship for all African 
Americans.125 
The Reconstruction Amendments made slavery unconstitutional and, in 
principle, ensured equality under the law.126  During the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s passage, Republican senators argued that freed slaves should 
have the full and equal benefits of the law.127  The fear was that failure to 
guarantee equal protection could place the “ex-slave . . . in a social limbo” and 
create tiered citizenship.128 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, on its face, ensures 
that all persons are equal under the law.129  Federal immigration law, however, 
emerged as an exception to this general rule.  Racial discrimination of Chinese 
immigrants challenged the Amendment’s boundaries in California.130 
California’s legislature, after having numerous taxes targeted at Chinese 
immigrants struck down as unconstitutional, switched tactics and passed laws 
in the 1870s under their police power, focusing on character and conduct.131  In 
actuality, the laws targeted Chinese women and the alleged goal was to keep 
lewd women from migrating into the state.132 
                                                                                                                          
of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, § 2, 1 Stat. 566, 567.  States also had to register aliens seeking 
naturalization and issue certificates of registry.  Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 153, 
154–55; see also NEUMAN, supra note 118, at 19–20. 
 121. NEUMAN, supra note 118, at 19–20. 
 122. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 665 (citing NEUMAN, supra note 118, at 20). 
 123. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05 (1857), superseded by U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
 124. FINKELMAN, supra note 48, at 315 (quoting DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 
1848–1861, at 293 (1976)). 
 125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII & XIV. 
 126. John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of 
the Laws,” 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 135–36 (1950). 
 127. Id. at 134–35. 
 128. Id. at 133–34 (comparing the potential differentiations to India’s caste system). 
 129. U.S. CONST. amend.  XIV. 
 130. Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A 
“Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1122–23 (1998); see also 
Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 682–89 (discussing California immigration law). 
 131. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 672–77. 
 132. Id. at 674–76; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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State regulation of immigration faltered in In re Ah Fong when a California 
district court found a California statute regulating the immigration of Chinese 
women unconstitutional.133  Circuit Justice Field posited that states could not 
exercise state police powers for “corrupt uses,” such as discrimination against 
free blacks.134  Justice Field indicated that previous state police powers were 
premised upon the institution of slavery and the exclusion of black slaves.135  
In the wake of the Civil War, he stated that “no such power would be asserted, 
or if asserted, allowed, in any federal court.”136  With the emancipation of 
slaves, states shifted their use of police power from a pretext for discriminating 
against African Americans to a pretext for the discrimination of Chinese 
immigrants.  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, this was as an invalid exercise 
of a state’s police power.137  Justice Field remarked that if Chinese migration 
“is to be stopped, recourse must be had to the federal government, where the 
whole power over this subject lies.”138 
Rather than striking down state discriminatory laws against immigrants, the 
federal government passed similar laws.139  At the time, the equal protection 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment were not applicable to the federal 
government.140  The Chinese exclusion laws of the 1880s marked the federal 
government’s entrance into prominent regulation of immigration.141  These 
laws were passed in reaction to the economic depression in California and 
concerns over Chinese laborers taking jobs away from native-born 
Americans.142 
The two main cases challenging the Chinese exclusion laws were Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States143 and Fong Yue Ting v. United States.144  In Chae, 
the Court “held that a returning resident non-citizen could be excluded if 
                                                     
 133. In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 216 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102). 
 134. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 688 (citing Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 216–17). 
 135. Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 216–17. 
 136. Id. at 217. 
 137. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 138. Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 217. 
 139. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 705–06. 
 140. Id. at 703–04.  It was not until 1954 that the Equal Protection Clause was applied to the 
federal government by incorporation into the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 703 n.317 (citing Bolling 
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)). 
 141. Chin, supra note 17, at 7 (“Anxiety over Asian immigration led the federal government 
to assume regulatory authority over immigration.”).  But see Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 
645 (arguing for the inclusion of the 1875 Page law, which excluded Chinese women from 
migrating to the country, as marking the federal government’s entrance into the regulation of 
immigration); Cleveland, supra note 117, at 106 (stating that Congress did not pass a major 
immigration law until 1875). 
 142. Chin, supra note 17, at 8.  “[M]any Chinese immigrants were miners, manual laborers, 
[and] laundrymen” and were viewed as a threat to American jobs.  Id. at 9. 
 143. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889). 
 144. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); see also Chin, supra note 
17, at 7 (discussing both cases). 
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Congress determined that his race was undesirable—or for any other 
reason.”145  Thus, the Court upheld a federal statute that prohibited unskilled 
migratory workers of Chinese descent from migrating to and remaining in the 
United States.146  Although this result is not incongruent with the modern 
understanding of constitutional equal protection,147 the Supreme Court found 
that Congress and the executive branch had plenary powers over immigration 
and believed that the judiciary should not intervene at the time.148 Moreover, in 
Fong, the Court determined  
[d]eportation or exclusion of aliens “may be exercised entirely 
through executive officers; or Congress may call in the aid of the 
judiciary to ascertain any contested facts.” Imposing the burden of 
proof on the Chinese person, and providing for testimony of white 
witnesses only “is within the acknowledged power of every 
legislature to prescribe the evidence which shall be received, and the 
effect of that evidence, in the courts of its own government.”149 
Chae sustained Congress’s plenary power over immigration,150 whereas 
Fong affirmed congressional power to pass deportation statutes excluding  
non-citizens based on race or for any other reason.151  Both cases affirmed that 
federal immigration power superseded the equal protection rights of 
immigrants.152 
Here, we see the affirmation of the federal government’s exclusive power 
over immigration, even in upholding racial exclusionary policies.  This is 
evident despite that, under equal protection norms, state discrimination against 
non-citizens receives greater scrutiny.153  Once the Court chose to uphold 
federal immigration laws, equal protection norms were not given much 
attention.154   
States’ use of police powers to exclude Chinese immigrants declined as 
southern states lost the ability to use police powers to control the migration of 
free African Americans155 and an increase of federal laws aimed at excluding 
                                                     
 145. Chin, supra note 17, at 7; see also Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
 146. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 589, 611. 
 147. See Chin, supra note 17, at 15. 
 148. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609. 
 149. Chin, supra note 17, at 19 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 714, 
729). 
 150. Id. at 7. 
 151. Id. 
 152. But see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898) (finding that, under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, a child born in America to Chinese parents was a U.S. citizen). 
 153. Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999). 
 154. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal Power, and the 
Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891, 939–41 (2007) (discussing other instances of 
constitutional conflict). 
 155. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 673. 
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Chinese immigrants replaced unconstitutional state attempts.156  If a person 
was in the country unlawfully, the violation gave the federal government the 
right to devalue a Chinese immigrant as a person and exploit his or her 
willingness to work at no cost.  Thus, the federal immigration system’s early 
foundation, instead of striking down discriminatory state immigration laws, 
simply moved discriminatory laws to the federal level where they continued 
against Chinese immigrants. 
In analyzing federal power over immigration, a commentator noted that 
[i]t was no coincidence that greater legal freedoms for African 
Americans were tied to Chinese misfortunes.  As one historian 
observed, “[w]ith Negro slavery a dead issue after 1865, greater 
attention was focused [on immigration from China].”  Political forces 
quickly reacted to fill the racial void in the political arena.  In 
California, partisan political concerns, along with labor unionism, in 
the post-Civil War period figured prominently in the anti-Chinese 
movement.157 
The Supreme Court explored the relationship between the treatment of 
African Americans and other racial minorities in Plessy v. Ferguson.158  Justice 
Harlan, dissenting from the “separate but equal” holding,159 made the first 
declaration that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind.”160  He also noted the irony 
that the “separate but equal” doctrine applied to blacks, who unquestionably 
were part of the political community, but not Chinese immigrants, “a race so 
different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become 
citizens of the United States” and who generally are excluded from entering 
the country.161  Justice Harlan, although promoting legal equality for citizens, 
continued to display a strong racial bias.162 
                                                     
 156. See id. at 690–98 (discussing other legislation passed by Congress in the 1870s). 
 157. Johnson, supra note 130, at 1123 (1998) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT 151 (1969)); see also 
Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 652 (stating that the “prevailing viewpoint was that Chinese 
laborers were effectively slaves” during the 1870s). 
 158. Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 159. Id. at 552. 
 160. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 161. Johnson, supra note 130, at 1124 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 162. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  And so it is, in 
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power.  So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the 
principles of constitutional liberty. 
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II.  IMMIGRATION: A STORY OF FAILED FEDERALISM 
A.  Parallel Stories of the Failure of Federalism 
The 1850 Fugitive Slave Act is analogous to current immigration 
enforcement laws and policies in terms of federal supremacy and congressional 
deference—both demonstrate the failure of federalism.  In the case of fugitive 
slaves, the states could not agree and the federal government was relatively 
powerless to enforce the desires of the southern states until 1850.  The 
underlying problem, of course, was a fundamental disagreement about the 
meaning of personhood and citizenship.  The southern states felt quite 
comfortable abusing African Americans’ rights because they strongly believed 
that slaves were property and they were not intended to become citizens.163  
The fundamental disagreement with the northern states on this issue made 
political compromise impossible.164 
The immigration story is an example of reverse-federalism.  States are 
currently frustrated by the federal government’s relative inaction on the 
immigration front.165  Accordingly, states like Alabama, Arizona, Utah, and 
Georgia have begun enacting their own immigration laws.166  The state 
immigration laws will have a significant impact on immigrant rights. This 
section examines the reverse federalism story and the extent to which current 
federal immigration enforcement policy reinforces state and local actors 
enacting their own immigration laws against both citizen and noncitizens’ 
rights—especially those who look or sound foreign. 
Similar to the time when the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act was enacted, there is 
currently a conflict amongst states and localities about how to address 
immigrants within their communities.167  Recently, various states and localities 
have enacted laws targeting immigrants while others have enacted laws that 
give sanctuary to immigrants within their communities. 168   
                                                     
 163. Johnson, supra note 97, at 178–80 (discussing the southern notion that slaves were less 
than citizens and thus had no due process rights when seized in the North). 
 164. Id. at 179. 
 165. Letter from Governor Janice Brewer to President Barack Obama (June 23, 2010), 
available at http://www.azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR_062410_LettertoPresidentObama.pdf; 
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 2010 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the 
States (Jan. 1–Dec. 31, 2010), NCSL (Jan. 5, 2011),  
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/2010-immigration-related-laws-and-resolutions-in-
t.aspx. 
 166. See, e.g., Common Threat Present in Immigration Law Challenges, CNN (June 28, 
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/06/28/immigration.laws/index.html. 
 167. Karla Mari McKanders, Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting 
Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 585 (2009). 
 168. Id. (“There are a multitude of state and local laws that target immigrants. For instance, 
some states and localities have passed ‘pro-immigrant’ laws encouraging immigration to their 
states, while others have passed ‘anti-immigrant’ laws that primarily deny immigrants essential 
services to force immigrants to leave the states and cities.”). 
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When discussing federal authority over immigration, most dialogues start 
with the proposition that immigration went largely unregulated until the federal 
government first exerted authority over immigration in the early twentieth 
century.169  Discussions related to federal supremacy in the area of 
immigration are often based on the plenary powers doctrine to justify federal 
control over immigration without a detailed examination of the historical 
underpinnings of the federal immigration system.170   
Recently, immigration scholars have focused on the relationship between 
federal, state, and local governments in regulating immigration.171  States and 
localities claim that they should be able to use their Tenth Amendment police 
powers to regulate immigrants within their borders, while the federal 
government claims exclusivity in the area of immigration law and policy.172   
One striking similarity between the Fugitive Slave Acts and current 
immigration laws is that the 1850 Act created a unique federal law 
enforcement institution that removed power from state and local hands.173  The 
Thomas Sims case perfectly illustrates the parallel.174  Thomas Sims, a fugitive 
slave, escaped to Massachusetts and began working.175  A few years later, his 
former owner located him in Massachusetts and sought his return.176  The 
former owner went through a commissioner to obtain a certificate of removal 
and then sought to arrest Sims.177  Instead of using U.S. Marshals to enforce 
the certificate of removal, the federal government deputized state and local 
officials as federal agents to enforce the provisions of the 1850 Act.178  City 
policemen were hastily sworn in as deputy federal marshals and effectuated the 
arrest.179  They ignored the Massachusetts personal liberty law, which stated 
that Massachusetts would not comply with the 1850 Act and return fugitive 
slaves to slave states in the South.180  Despite the clash between federal and 
Massachusetts law, Sims was returned to Georgia as a fugitive slave.181 
                                                     
 169. Neuman, supra note 7, at 1833–35. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See generally Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. 
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B. States and Localities Take Action 
Currently, states and localities argue that the federal government fails to 
enforce existing federal law governing the removal of immigrants within their 
borders.182  For example, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(a) 
gives U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) the power to 
interrogate any person believed to be a noncitizen regarding his or her right to 
be present in the United States and to arrest noncitizens for violation of 
immigration laws.183  Further, INA § 287(g) empowers the federal government 
to enter into agreements with states and localities to apprehend and deport 
undocumented immigrants.184  States and localities believe that the federal 
government is not effectively implementing these types of federal provisions 
and, as a result, have begun enacting their own laws that mimic § 287(a).185 
1.  Arizona: S.B. 1070 
Arizona has perhaps the most controversial law, which overtly permits its 
state and local law enforcement officials to exercise federal immigration 
powers.186  In April 2010, Arizona passed S.B. 1070: The Support Our Law 
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act.187  Its purpose is to use state and 
local government actors to target undocumented immigrants in order to 
increase the attrition of undocumented immigrants out of the state.188 
Under the law, any person who the police reasonably suspect of being an 
undocumented immigrant may be subject to detention and questioning 
regarding their immigration status.189  Section 2 requires officers to make a 
reasonable attempt, when practicable, to determine an individual’s immigration 
status during any lawful stop, detention, or arrest already effected.190  Section 2 
also requires that all arrested persons have their immigration status determined 
prior to release.191  Further, Section 2 describes who may verify immigration 
statuses and lists documents that create a presumption of lawful presence.192  
                                                     
 182. Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 570, 575. 
 183. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2006). 
 184. Id. § 1357(g). 
 185. Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 570, 575. 
 186. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 165 (“Bills similar to Arizona’s were 
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STAT. ANN. (2011)). 
 188. S.B. 1070, Sec. 1, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 450 (“The provisions of this act are 
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economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”). 
 189. S.B. 1070, Sec. 2, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws at 451. 
 190. Id. 
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These provisions closely resemble the federal immigration powers of INA 
§ 287(a).193 
Section 3 of S.B. 1070 criminalizes the failure to carry an alien registration 
document at the state level.194  Section 3 provides that “a person is guilty of 
willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person 
is in violation of” 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or § 1306(a), which are analogous federal 
statutes.195  A first offense is a class one misdemeanor, punishable by up to 
twenty days of incarceration and up to a $100 fine.196  The second offense is 
punishable by up to thirty days of jail time.197 
The Arizona law was challenged in United States v. Arizona198 and Friendly 
House v. Whiting.199  The Whiting lawsuit alleged that S.B. 1070 interferes 
with federal immigration law in violation of the Supremacy Clause, causes 
racial profiling in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and violates the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.200  One of the plaintiffs, Jim 
Shee, is an American citizen of Spanish and Chinese descent and is fluent in 
Spanish.201  Despite having lived in Arizona his entire life, he alleges that the 
police have racially profiled him twice in a single month and asked him to 
produce his citizenship papers.202  Shee fears that the bill’s implementation 
would increase the incidence of these frustrating situations.203  Recently, in 
United States v. Arizona, in June 2012, the Supreme Court struck down the 
Arizona law as constitutionally preempted with the exception of section 2, 
which requires the police to check the immigration status of persons whom 
they detain before releasing them.  The Court found that the law’s mandate for 
state and local police offers to make reasonable attempts to determine the 
immigration status of a detained person does not interfere with federal 
immigration laws.204 
                                                     
 193. Compare id., with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2006). 
 194. S.B. 1070, Sec. 3, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws at 453–55. 
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 198. 70 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, 
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 204. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
2012] Immigration Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave Acts 943 
2.  Alabama: House Bill 56 
More recently, Alabama passed House Bill 56, the Beason-Hammon 
Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act.205  Opponents of the bill claim 
that Alabama Governor Robert Bentley “touted HB 56 as ‘the strongest 
immigration bill in the country’ and a co-sponsor of the bill boasted that it 
regulates ‘every aspect of a person’s life.’”206  The ACLU alleges that H.B. 56 
is “[a] shocking throwback to the days of de jure segregation, [and] attempts to 
make a class of individuals non-persons in the eyes of the law.”207 
H.B. 56 asserts there is “a compelling public interest to discourage illegal 
immigration by requiring all agencies within [Alabama] to fully cooperate with 
federal immigration authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration 
laws.”208  This law goes even further than Arizona’s, authorizing the Alabama 
Department of Homeland Security to hire and maintain its own immigration 
enforcement body.209  Like Arizona’s S.B. 1070, H.B. 56 Section 12(a) 
requires a law enforcement officer to make a reasonable attempt to determine 
the immigration status of a detained person when reasonable suspicion exists 
that the person is an unlawful alien.210  Further, H.B. 56 Section 18 allows 
police to detain persons found driving without a proper license for up to forty-
eight hours to determine their immigration status.211  The most controversial 
part of the statute requires an assessment of immigration status for every 
student in Alabama public schools when the student enrolls.212 
On July 8, 2011, the Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama filed a lawsuit 
against the state alleging that federal immigration law preempts H.B. 56.213  
Specifically, the complaint claims that: 
HB 56 will subject Alabamians—including countless U.S. citizens 
and non-citizens who have permission from the federal government 
to remain in the United States—to unlawful interrogations, searches, 
seizures, and arrests, and will result in racial profiling.  This is 
because HB 56 mandates law enforcement officers to investigate the 
immigration status of any individual they stop, detain, or arrest when 
                                                     
 205. H.R. H.B. 56, 2011 Leg. (Ala. 2011). 
 206. Complaint at 2, Hispanic Interest Coal. Of Ala. V. Bentley, No. 5:11-cv-2428-SLB, 
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they have “reasonable suspicion” that the individual lacks 
immigration status. Individuals who may be perceived as “foreign” 
by state or local law enforcement agents will be in constant jeopardy 
of harassment and unlawfully prolonged detention and arrest by state 
law enforcement officers operating under HB 56’s new immigration 
enforcement mandates. And all Alabamians will be required to carry 
state-approved identity documentation in order to prevent lengthy 
investigations as to their status.214 
Like the Supreme Court in the Arizona case, the district court judge refused 
to enjoin Section 12 of the Act, which requires state and local law enforcement 
officials to try to verify a person’s immigration status during routine traffic 
stops or arrests.215  The court also denied the injunction of Section 10, which 
criminalized the willful failure of a person in the country illegally to carry 
federal immigration papers, because the sections were not preempted by 
federal law.216  Like the laws that violated the rights of fugitive slaves, 
Alabama’s law is reminiscent of “pervasive and systematic targeting of a class 
of persons through punitive state laws that seek to render every aspect of daily 
life more difficult and less equal.”217  
3.  Georgia’s Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act 
Another timely example is the Georgia Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Enforcement Act of 2011.218  The statute provides criminal sanctions for 
identity fraud219 and transporting220 or harboring an illegal alien.221  The status 
also contains provisions similar to the Act of 1850, broadly allowing certain 
federal documents and oral testimony to summarily establish a person’s 
unlawful status.222  The law further provides that during an investigation, upon 
probable cause, state and local police officers may 
                                                     
 214. Id. (citations omitted). 
 215. Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 5:11-CV-02484-SLB, 2011 WL 
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verify such suspect’s immigration status when the suspect is unable 
to provide one of the following: (1) A secure and verifiable 
document as defined in [the Georgia law]; (2) A valid Georgia 
driver’s license; (3) A valid Georgia identification card issued by the 
Department of Driver Services; (4) If the entity requires proof of 
legal presence in the United States before issuance, any valid driver’s 
license from a state or district of the United States or any valid 
identification document issued by the United States federal 
government; . . . (6) Other information as to the suspect’s identity 
that is sufficient to allow the peace officer to independently identify 
the suspect.223 
Like the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act, this law empowers the state to exercise 
federal enforcement powers.224 
Similar to the Arizona and Alabama laws, the Georgia law was challenged in 
Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal.225  The lawsuit alleged that 
the Georgia statute violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses by 
unlawfully discriminating against people based on national origin.226  The 
plaintiff, Jaypaul Singh, is a U.S. citizen of South Asian descent, who 
permanently resides in Washington state.227  Singh, a law student, spends 
summers in Atlanta as a law clerk.228  He has a Washington driver’s license, 
but that state does not determine an applicant’s immigration status before 
issuing a license.229  Thus, his license is insufficient to verify his immigration 
status under the new Georgia law.230  Singh fears that he might be subjected to 
a long detention while police try to ascertain his immigration status.231 
4.  Utah: H.B. 497 
In Utah, the recently passed H.B. 497 requires state and local law 
enforcement officers to verify the immigration or citizenship status of 
individuals they encounter who are unlawfully present in the United States.232  
Plaintiffs in Utah Coalition of LaRaza v. Herbert alleged that the statute 
violates the Equal Protection Clause because it encourages racial profiling of 
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Latinos and anyone who looks or sounds foreign.233  Similar to the Arizona 
and Georgia profiling stories, one plaintiff, Milton Ivan Salazar-Gomez, is a 
resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, and fears that he will be subject to racial 
profiling.234  Although he has lived in the United States for nearly his entire 
life, he is a Mexican national whose parents brought him to the United States 
when he was ten months old.235  Salazar-Gomez was stopped for driving with 
expired tags and turned over to federal immigration officials.236  Following two 
months of detainment, he was released and now fears that he might be stopped 
and harassed during the pendency of his removal proceedings.237 
C.  State Laws Demonstrate a Failure of Federalism 
The Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, and Utah laws mirror INA § 287(a), which 
provides federal officers the right to interrogate persons believed to be in the 
United States without authorization.238  Reminiscent of personal liberty 
laws,239 states claim they are inclined to pass anti-immigrant laws because the 
federal government is not taking action to remedy unauthorized 
immigration.240  Both the Fugitive Slave Acts and current state immigration 
laws demonstrate the failure of federalism.  The underlying problem in both 
cases is a fundamental disagreement couched in terms of federalism that pits 
states’ powers against citizens’ civil rights.241  The current passage of state 
immigration laws represents reverse-federalism.  States like Alabama, Arizona, 
Utah, and Georgia are responding to federal inaction and are enacting their 
own immigration laws, whereas the era of the 1850 Act witnessed the federal 
government taking supreme authority over the regulation of fugitive slaves. 
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III.  THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACTS AND CURRENT IMMIGRATION LAWS CREATE 
OUTSIDERS 
A.  Racial Profiling and the Presumption of Illegality Against Fugitive Slaves 
and Immigrants 
State enforcement of federal immigration laws often leads to racial profiling.  
This practice, a presumption of illegality based on racial identity,242 is 
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.243  It is also inconsistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantees.  The Department of Justice has 
stated that racial profiling, 
at its core[,] concerns the invidious use of race or ethnicity as a 
criterion in conducting stops, searches, and other law enforcement 
investigative procedures.  It is premised on the erroneous assumption 
that any particular individual or one race or ethnicity is more likely 
to engage in misconduct than any particular individual of another 
race or ethnicity.244 
When law enforcement engages in profiling, there is “[n]o logical 
relationship . . . between any of these characteristics and the commission of 
crimes.”245  Yet, “[g]overnment agencies employ race-based enforcement 
tactics without empirical proof of their success.”246 
During enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Acts, courts held that 
[i]n the case of a person visibly appearing to be a negro, the 
presumption is, in this country, that he is a slave, and it is incumbent 
on him to make out his right to freedom: but in the case of a person 
visibly appearing to be a white man, or an Indian, the presumption is 
that he is free, and it is necessary for his adversary to shew [sic] that 
he is a slave.247 
Thus, presumptions in the recovery of fugitive slaves are very similar to 
current racial profiling.248  The legislation, which permitted slave owners to 
                                                     
 242. Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of 
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capture any African American and impress him into servitude, was as racially 
focused as today’s profiling.249 
An example of the use of racial profiling in the enforcement of the 1850 Act 
is illustrated in the story of Solomon Northrup, a free African American,250 
who was captured by James H. Burch, a slave catcher and dealer.251  Northrup 
was racially profiled, abducted, and incarcerated and did not did not know why 
he was imprisoned, as he was never a slave.252  Scholar Larry Stokes explains 
that 
[a] White could fraudulently claim that a Black was a slave, and 
there was very little that a Free Negro could do about it.  There 
always existed the danger of a free Black being kidnapped, as often 
happened, and taken into slavery.  A large majority of free Blacks 
lived in daily fear of losing what freedom they had.  One slip of 
ignorance of the law would endanger their slight freedom and place 
them into slavery.253 
Anti-slavery activists pointed out the frequent occurrence of free African 
American men and women being illegally enslaved.254 
In recent state and federal immigration laws, there appears to be a similar 
presumption of illegality that is applied to Latinos.  For example, in United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court held that immigration officers 
could use racial identifiers with other factors near the U.S. border.255  
Immigration scholar Kevin Johnson critiqued this decision as authorizing the 
racial profiling of Latinos.256  Just as Northrup was racially profiled as a slave 
because he was African American, Brignoni allows the presumption that a 
Latino with predominant Mesoamerican features near the border is 
unauthorized.257 
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Renteria-Villegas v. Hall is demonstrative of the Latino presumption.258  The 
Davidson County Sheriff’s Office of Nashville, Tennessee, detained Daniel 
Renteria-Villegas, a 19-year-old Portland, Oregon-born man, twice within the 
same month.259  During the first incident, even though the arrest report and 
booking documents stated that Renteria-Villegas was born in Portland, Oregon, 
he was placed on an “ICE hold.”260  The arresting officer, without asking, 
recorded Renteria-Villegas’s place of birth as Mexico.261  Renteria-Villegas 
was not released until his family presented officials with his passport and birth 
certificate.262 
These cases illustrate how racial profiling reinforces the unequal application 
of the laws against certain populations. Lawful residents fear unlawful 
detention based on criteria such as their race, ethnicity, or proximity to the 
border.  Racial profiling in enforcement may lead to denied access to counsel, 
unlawful, prolonged detention without the bringing of charges, and denial of 
substantive and procedural due process rights.263 
B.  Membership Within a State: Are Fugitive Slaves and Immigrants Chattel or 
Humans? 
Both the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act and current immigration policies have 
inspired a debate that requires the American people to decide if human beings 
who live and work among us are morally and legally equal to us.  The purpose 
of this comparison is to highlight similarities between the enforcement of 
immigration laws and the Fugitive Slave Acts’ regulation of human labor.  
This comparison demonstrates that immigration policies should be instituted 
based on norms that recognize the personhood and humanity of the subjects of 
the law.  The key connection between the Fugitive Slave Acts and current 
migration policies is the ways in which immigration law and policy have 
facilitated dehumanization and created a quasi-citizen worker.    
The most significant parallel between the Fugitive Slave Acts and the 
current deportation regime is the unjust treatment of human subjects in the 
course of using cheap labor to maximize profit.  Slaves were treated as chattel 
property and forced into labor.  They were counted as three-fifths of a person 
for purposes of Congressional representation and received no protections under 
the law.264  U.S. immigration policies have sought the benefit of migrant 
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laborers separate from their value as persons.265  At times, our country’s 
migration policies are executed in a manner in which people are seen as 
machines that simply move levers.266  This approach has resulted in laws that 
infringe on the personal liberties of target classes.267  
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This personless approach is reinforced when those who do not have 
citizenship are denied the protection of the law.268  When a person does not fit 
within membership in a polity, that person may be outside of state protection 
of rights and can be subject to subordination and exploitation.  In this context, 
when people are divorced from their humanity, the policies surrounding their 
migration perpetuate dehumanization.  In the area of immigration law, scholars 
such as Kevin Johnson and Linda Bosniak have critiqued how the immigration 
system has continually perpetuated the subordination of marginalized 
groups.269  Bosniak specifically critiques “progressive” scholarship in that it 
“tends to normatively embrace the very national boundary which serves to 
effect, and justify, the immigrants’ exclusion.”270  This context questions the 
“‘national political imagination,’ one which regards the national community as 
the predominant community of normative concern and presumes the 
legitimacy, and perhaps the necessity of maintaining borders around it.”271  
Thus, despite their contributions, immigrants’ individual rights are severely 
restricted.272  Although there must be some form of immigration laws under 
these theories, our country must examine and limit these laws to the extent that 
they violate equal protection norms.  One can accept some difference in the 
law, but one cannot accept laws that blatantly violate equal protection norms. 
There is a striking similarity in the regulation of both slaves and migrant 
workers to low paying and low status jobs.  Slaves performed jobs such as 
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agricultural and household work.273  Today, both documented and 
undocumented migratory workers are pigeonholed into low paying agriculture, 
household, and construction jobs.274  In both positions, the law facilitates the 
exploitation of the most vulnerable population. 
The Reconstruction Amendments were intended to “abolish[] all class 
legislation in the States and [do] away with the injustices of subjecting one 
caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.”275  Similarly, when 
immigration law and policy begin to recognize the humanity of the subjects of 
the laws, there will be more equitable policies towards immigrants who come 
to the United States as economic migrants.  Most acknowledge that “[s]lavery 
was a system of racial adjustment and social order.”276  So, too, is an 
immigration regime that has the indirect effect of targeting the poorest 
immigrants of color.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Scholars caution “against creating simplistic solutions to contemporary 
problems based on complex legal history.”277  The similarities between current 
immigration policies and the Fugitive Slave Acts provide insight into current 
enforcement policies and how federal policies should not follow the same 
patterns that earlier failed to provide equal protection under the law.  In both 
instances, state and federal governments can enact oppressive laws that fail to 
recognize the humanity of the subjects of the laws.   
The Fugitive Slave Acts had no procedural protections for free blacks or 
fugitive slaves.278  Further, the plenary powers doctrine was implemented in a 
manner that, while reinforcing Congress’s ability to legislate immigration 
matters, also supported the violation of Chinese migrant workers’ rights.  
Historically, multiplying forces have widespread implications on immigrants’ 
equal protection rights. This is evident from the allegations in the Arizona, 
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Alabama, Georgia and Utah cases.  Inevitably, having numerous states and 
localities enforce immigration policies will lead to increased racial profiling. 
Under the Fugitive Slave Acts, all basic rights of humanity were denied to 
African Americans.  
[B]lack slaves enjoyed no social status, no wealth, no political 
influence in the North. This was as weak and disadvantaged a 
minority as has ever lived in the nation. Whether free or slave, in the 
decades preceding the Civil War blacks were a group particularly 
vulnerable to profile based seizures.279 
The unlawful Fugitive Slave Acts reinforced this caste-like system. 
Current anti-immigration laws in several states and municipalities across the 
country deny undocumented immigrants their humanity based upon their 
unlawful entry into the United States or permitting their immigration status to 
expire.  Like the Fugitive Slave Acts, some state and local laws, such as those 
in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, and Utah, were intended to exclude people, 
regardless of their immigration status, from formerly homogenous states, cities 
and towns.280 
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